The post-Apartheid South African corporate governance (CG) model is a unique hybridisation of the traditional Anglo-American and Continental European-Asian CG models, distinctively requiring firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, such as black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment, HIV/Aids, and health and safety. This paper examines the association between a composite CG index and firm value in this distinct corporate setting within a simultaneous equation framework. Using a sample of post-Apartheid South African listed corporations, and controlling for potential interdependencies among block ownership, board size, leverage, institutional ownership, firm value and a broad CG index, we find a significant positive association between a composite CG index and firm value. Further, our two-stage least squares results show that there is also a reverse association between our broad CG index and firm value, emphasising the need for future research to adequately control for potential interrelationships between possible alternative CG mechanisms and firm value. Distinct from prior studies, we find that compliance with affirmative action CG provisions impacts positively on firm value. Our results are consistent with agency, legitimacy, political cost, and resource dependence theoretical predictions. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that adequately control for different types of endogeneity problems, and alternative accounting, and market-based firm valuation proxies.
Introduction
Agency theory suggests a positive association between corporate governance (CG) and firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , as good governance improves managerial monitoring and decision-making, as well as reduces managerial expropriation and wastage, and thereby enhances operating performance and market valuation (Renders et al., 2010) . However, while a number of prior studies (reviewed below) suggest a positive link between CG and firm value, most have been unable to conclusively indicate that good governance actually impacts positively on firm value.
A number of reasons may explain the empirically weak association between CG and firm value. First, prior studies have been criticised for methodological weaknesses, with particular regard to inadequately addressing endogeneity problems (Guest, 2009; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) , as well as insufficient control for any potential interrelationships between CG and other possible alternative CG mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006) . Second, due to the highly labour-intensive nature of collecting firm-level CG data directly from company annual reports (Beattie et al., 2004) , prior studies have mostly used subjective analysts" CG ratings, often supplied by rating agencies, such as Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005) . Renders et al. (2010) show that the use of such subjective analysts" CG ratings leads to significant sample selection bias as they tend to be severely biased towards a few large firms. The associated econometric problems weaken statistical power and obscure the association between CG and firm value (Core et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) .
Thirdly, and crucially, the prior literature notes that CG structures and systems vary across different countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazzura, 2009 ). However, past cross-country studies have not only generally employed subjective analysts" CG ratings, which are standardised such that they fail to reflect unique institutional, cultural and contextual differences in CG mechanisms across different countries (Morey et al., 2009; Renders et al., 2010) , but also such studies remain disproportionately concentrated in the developed countries of Europe and US with comparatively similar institutional settings (Gomper et al., 2003; Baur et al., 2004; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010) . However, the role and effectiveness of CG may arguably be different in developing countries, such as South Africa (SA), due to the different institutional, cultural, legal and CG environment (as discussed further below), and as such, the link between CG and firm value can be expected to be different from what has been reported in developed countries.
The current study attempts to address the above limitations by investigating the association between CG and firm value in a distinct post-Apartheid SA corporate context. Historically, South Africa"s CG model has predominantly been Anglo-American (shareholding) in orientation, with firms primarily expected to serve the interests of shareholders. However, post-Apartheid CG reforms, especially the 2002 King Report (King II), distinctively require SA firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions aimed at addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between white and non-white South Africans. These include compliance with black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment, HIV/Aids, and Health and Safety CG provisions. This compels SA firms to depict some of the key features of both the shareholding and stakeholding (Continental Europe-Asia) models of CG in their annual reports, and thus explicitly makes the South African CG model a hybrid and unique within the Anglo-American world (Andreasson, 2013) .
Given this context, the crucial policy question, is whether the current hybrid South African CG framework is sufficiently robust to effectively achieve the contrasting objectives of maximising shareholder value and providing a meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002) . On the one hand, in order to effectively address affirmative action and stakeholder needs, post-Apartheid SA firms will invariably have to incur extra costs with a potential negative effect on shareholder value (LSE, 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a) . On the other hand, political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories (Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Andreasson, 2013) suggest that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions does not only help in reducing political costs, but also offers greater access to resources that can be translated into improved operating performance and market valuation. Resource dependence may be particularly important in SA, given that securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts are usually linked to meeting affirmative action, such as black empowerment (Malherbe and Segal, 2003) . Hence, we examine the link between CG and firm value within this arguably unique institutional setting, where there is also a conspicuous dearth of empirical evidence 1 . Importantly, and distinct from prior studies, we construct a broad CG index specifically for the South African setting that permits us to uniquely investigate how specific affirmative action and stakeholder issues, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids, affect firm value.
In addition, we explicitly address methodological and econometric problems that have characterised most previous studies. To avoid sample selection bias, our sample is based on all the firms that are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Ltd, with the CG data collected directly from company annual reports. We also address different types of endogeneity problems, including simultaneity and firm-level fixed effects, as well as control for potential interrelations between our broad CG index and four alternative CG mechanisms that we have data on, including board size, leverage, block ownership, and institutional ownership. In doing so, we make major contributions to the extant literature. First, using CG data collected from annual reports, we construct for the first time insider trading and listing rules have been introduced (Insider Trading Act, 1998; JSE Listing Rules, 2007) , their implementation and enforcement is weak (King Committee, 2002; . In sum, these SA context-specific issues can result in managerial entrenchment, as well as expropriation of shareholder wealth, that can impact negatively on firm value.
Of greater relevance, however, is that CG seems to be fluidly developing in SA. A formal code of CG was first introduced in 1994 (King I) and revised in 2002 (King II) (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009 ), coinciding with the collapse of Apartheid, the historic release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the subsequent assumption to power by the African National Congress (ANC). While CG reforms pursued so far in SA are generally similar to those of other Anglo-American countries (see Sections 1 to 3 of the Appendix), the current South African CG model is distinct by its promotion of the "inclusive" approach (Andreasson, 2013) .
The SA "inclusive" CG approach seeks to maintain and strengthen all the Anglo-American (shareholding)
features, such as unitary boards, voluntary compliance, and majority outside directors, but it distinctively requires firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder (stakeholding) laws passed by the ruling ANC on black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment and HIV/Aids (see Section 4 of the Appendix). As previously explained, these are aimed at addressing residual negative socio-economic legacies of Apartheid. For example, preferential procurement provisions of the 2003 Black Empowerment Act require SA corporations to as much as possible acquire their raw materials from a non-white supplier irrespective of costs.
Additionally, SA companies are required to comply with positive discriminatory practices regarding board appointments, enterprise development, and equity ownership, amongst others. In sum, these affirmative action provisions may arguably impact differently on firm value, and as such the association between CG and firm value can be expected to be different from what has been reported in other Anglo-American countries.
The empirical literature on the association between CG and firm value is not only mixed, but also concentrated in Europe and the US. For example, Gompers et al. (2003) , Cremers and Nair (2005) , and Bebchuk et al. (2009) have examined the relationship between a broad CG index and firm value for samples of US firms, with the findings showing that CG impacts positively on firm value. In contrast, and after controlling for endogeneity, Core et al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find no evidence of an association between CG and firm value in samples of US firms, casting doubt on prior studies, as well as highlighting the relevance of adequately controlling for endogeneity. Previous European studies have also reported similar conflicting results. While Baur et al. (2004) report no evidence of a relationship between CG and firm value in a sample of European firms, Drobetz et al. (2004) and Beiner et al. (2006) find that CG is positively related to firm value in samples of German and Swiss firms, respectively. After controlling for both endogeneity and sample selection bias, Renders et al. (2010) also report positive association between CG and firm value in a sample of European firms, but find an insignificant or negative relationship if the two problems are not properly addressed, re-enforcing the need to sufficiently control for both sample selection bias and endogeneity for robust results.
Limited, but more consistent evidence has been reported for a number of emerging markets. Black (2001) , Black et al. (2006) , Black and Khanna (2007) , Henry (2008) , and Garay and González (2008) have investigated the association between a broad CG index and firm value, using samples of Russian, South Korean, Indian, Australian, and Venezuelan listed firms, respectively. Consistent with past cross-country studies in emerging markets (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009) , the results of these studies indicate a positive relationship between CG and firm value. Of special note, despite increasing evidence that sample selection bias and endogeneity problems can confound research findings Renders et al., 2010) , a majority of the prior cross-country studies in emerging markets do not explicitly address these problems, casting doubt on the reliability of the results of these studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009) . For example, the CLSA 2000 subjective analysts" CG ratings used in previous cross-country studies by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) include only nine 2 of the largest SA listed firms, and this arguably limits the generalisation of their findings for SA listed firms.
As previously explained, the current study on CG in SA attempts to address these weaknesses of prior studies in several ways. First, we use the entire usable sample of 169 SA listed firms over a five-year period in our analysis, and unlike past cross-country studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005) , we are able to ascertain the effects of both cross-sectional and time series changes in CG on firm value, as well as improve the generalisation of the results. Second, we construct a broad CG index (CGI) based on the CG provisions of King II, which unlike subjective analysts" rankings (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009) , has the advantage of ensuring that unique SA context-specific CG provisions, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids are incorporated into the methodology.
Third, and distinct from prior studies, we study how compliance with a sub-index of SA setting specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions impact on our sampled firms" market value. Finally, to improve the reliability of the results, we explicitly address problems that may be posed by the presence of endogeneities, as well as possible interdependencies among alternative CG mechanisms.
Data and Research Methodology

Data: Sample Selection, Sources, and Description
Our sample is based on all 291 non-financial 3 firms listed on the JSE as at 31/12/2007 and Table 1 contains a summary of the sample selection procedure. Panels A and B of Table 1 show the industrial composition of all nonfinancial firms that were listed on the JSE, and the final sampled firms with full data, respectively. We use CG and financial performance data to investigate the relationship between CG and firm value. The CG variables were extracted from the annual reports of the sampled companies. The annual reports were obtained from the Perfect Information Database, while the financial performance data were collected from DataStream. The firms in our final sample had to meet two criteria: the availability of a company"s full five year annual reports from These criteria were imposed for several reasons.
First, and in line with past research (Henry, 2008) , the criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis, and its associated advantages in terms of having both time series and cross-sectional observations, more degrees of freedom and less collinearity among variables (Gujarati, 2003) . A potential weakness is that it may introduce survivorship bias into the sample selection process. However, and as Table 1 indicates, the criteria still generated a much larger sample size than what has been used in prior SA studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009) , and therefore, generalisation of the results of our study should not be impaired by our sample selection criteria.
Second, contrary to much of the existing literature that employs one-year cross-sectional data (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005) , analysing five-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may help in ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional association between CG and firm value also holds over time.
Using the above criteria, and as detailed in Panel B of Table 1 , the full data is collected for 169 out of the 291 5 firms over five firm-years, giving a total of 845 firm-year observations from eight industries for our regression analysis.
Research Methodology: Definition of Variables and Model Specification
Our main independent variable is the constructed CG index (CGI), which involves an aggregation of the 50 CG provisions contained in King II, based on five broad sections covering: (1) boards, directors and ownership, (2) accounting and auditing, (3) risk management, internal audit and control, (4) integrated sustainability reporting, and (5) compliance and enforcement. These are detailed in the Appendix. All companies listed on the JSE are required to comply with the CG provisions or give reasons for non-compliance, enabling us to conduct our analysis.
Our CGI is distinct from CG variables used in prior research. First, unlike most previous studies that focus on specific aspects of CG in isolation, for instance, shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003) , and board size (Guest, 2009) , CGI covers all aspects of CG. Second, in line with prior research (Beiner et al., 2006) , the index covers conventional CG issues, such as board and ownership, but distinct from past research (Morey et al., 2009) , it also covers SA context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions. A sub-index defined as Social-CGI that contains nine CG provisions of the CGI is formed (see Section 4 of the Appendix), to cover specific aspects, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids. The CGI is constructed by awarding a value of "1" for each of the 50 CG provisions of King II if disclosed in the annual report or "0" otherwise. With this scheme, a company"s total score in a particular firm-year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), with better-governed firms having higher index levels. Although this simple binary weighting scheme may fail to reflect the relative importance of different CG mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003) , we adopt it for a number of reasons.
First, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights can be accurately assigned to the various CG provisions (Black et al., 2006) , and thus, using an unweighted coding scheme obviates a situation whereby the CGI is unnecessarily dominated by a particular set of CG provisions. Second, an unweighted index is transparent and easy to replicate (Beiner et al., 2006) . Third, prior studies suggest that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give similar results . Finally, an unweighted coding scheme is a well-established line of scoring CG information disclosed in annual reports (Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Morey et al., 2009) , and can also facilitate direct comparisons to be drawn with their results. Theoretically, better-governed firms can be expected to reduce agency costs and increase firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , and hence, we hypothesise a positive relationship between our CGI and firm value.
The measure of market valuation employed in our regression is the widely used Tobin"s Q (Q). 6 Following Chung and Pruitt (1994) , Q denotes the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets. It measures the market"s valuation of the quality of a firm"s CG mechanisms. A higher Q generally suggests greater effectiveness of a firm"s CG structures, as well as a better perception of a company"s financial performance by the market . To minimise potential omitted variables bias, we introduce below a number of control variables. Table 2 provides a summary of all variables employed, including the control variables, the four alternative CG mechanisms (board size, leverage, block ownership, and institutional ownership) and two alternative firm value measures (return on assets and total share returns) that will be used in conducting robustness tests in section five. First, we predict a positive association between Q and growth opportunities (GROWTH), because firms with higher investment opportunities tend to grow relatively faster (Durnev and Kim, 2005) . Second, firms with greater investment in research and development can gain competitive advantages , and so may have higher Q. By contrast, research and development is capital intensive (Henry, 2008) , and as such may impact negatively on current Q. Similarly, Jensen (1986) suggests that higher levels of gearing can increase performance by reducing agency conflicts associated with having "free cash flows" by opportunistic managers. In contrast, greater financial distress associated with higher levels of gearing can inhibit the ability to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986 ).
Also, due to greater agency problems, larger firms are likely to maintain better CG regimes (Beiner et al., 2006) , and thus may have higher Q. By contrast, smaller firms have greater opportunities to grow (Klapper and Love, 2004) , and hence may have higher Q. Given the mixed literature, we predict that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and firm size (LNTA) will relate either positively or negatively to Q. Third, firms that crosslist to foreign stock markets tend to have better CG structures, as they are subjected to additional CG rules (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010) , and thus may have higher Q. Hence, we hypothesise a positive link between Q and crosslisting (CROSLIST).
Fourth, auditor independence and audit quality are positively associated with audit firm size (DeAngelo, 1981) , implying that firms audited by large and reputable audit firms may have higher Q. Hence, we predict a positive association between Q and audit firm size. Fifth, to avoid endogeneity problems, we construct our regression model such that this year"s firm value (Q t ) is associated with previous year"s CG mechanisms (CG t-1 ), and as such we follow past studies (Renders et al., 2010) and include a lagged Q as part of our controls. We hypothesise that Q t-1 will correlate positively with Q t . Finally, following prior research (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009) , we predict that Q will differ across different industries and financial years. As such, we introduce year (2003 to 2007) and industry dummies for the five remaining industries. 7 Assuming that all relationships are linear, our main OLS regression equation to be estimated is specified as:
where:
Q -Tobin"s Q, proxy for firm value.  -Error term.
2SLS, Alternative CG Mechanisms and Possible Interrelationships
The Need to Control for Possible Interdependencies among Alternative CG Mechanisms
A considerable number of assumptions underline cross-sectional regressions of CG on firm value (Q). First, there is an assumption that the extent to which individual CG mechanisms, such as institutional ownership and board size are used is mainly determined within the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) . Second, cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q assume that some CG mechanisms are more important than others (e.g., Black et al., 2006) . A third assumption underlying cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q is that there are no mandatory or statutory CG provisions 8 for firms to comply with (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998) , which was largely the case before the worldwide proliferation of CG codes in the early 1990s (Black et al., 2006) . Fourth, cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q assumes that agency problems vary across firms due to differences in ownership, size, complexity of operations, and industry, amongst other, firm-level characteristics (Gompers et al., 2003) . Fifth, firms" external CG mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, investor monitoring, legal, and regulatory rules are exogenously determined, in which variations across firms" external environments may either help maximise or destroy firm value (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) . Finally, cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q assumes that the use of individual CG structures are not necessarily complementary such that where one CG mechanism is used more, others may be used less, leading to equally good performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998) . This suggests that there is an optimal relationship between the use of CG mechanisms and Q in which a firm will continue to institute CG structures until marginal costs are equal to marginal gains (Beiner et al., 2006) .
As a result, a firm"s CG choices are assumed to be an endogenous response to: (i) specific firm needs or business purposes, including preventing hostile takeovers, the desire to attract qualified independent directors, and shareholder pressure; (ii) important court rulings or decisions; (iii) professional business and legal advice; (iv) peer behaviour in which a firm adopts provisions used by competitors or common provisions within the industry; and (v) its investment opportunities, information, and regulatory environment (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998) . A major implication is that to be effective, CG mechanisms may need to interrelate and/or interact. Therefore, the presence of omitted variables, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions can introduce endogeneity problems into cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q that employ single structural equations (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) . This is because the existence of alternative CG mechanisms and the possibility for the existence of interdependencies, for example, may lead to omitted variable bias and spurious correlations in such single equation regressions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252) . However, most prior CG studies have examined the wealth effects of CG structures in isolation using single structural equations. According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006) , one way of addressing such potential endogeneities is to estimate a system of simultaneous equations that rely on an extensive set of alternative CG mechanisms, such as leverage, block ownership, and board size. More specifically, this involves specifying a system of simultaneous equations, whereby each one of the CG structures is the dependent variable in one of the other equations. The implication is that the choice of any one of the CG mechanisms may depend upon the choices of all the other mechanisms, in addition to all specified control variables in the system (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.382; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252) .
We address this methodological criticism (i.e., that an OLS regression of Q on a single CG mechanism, as specified in equation 1, for instance, can lead to misleading results) of past studies by introducing four alternative CG mechanisms that we have data on, in addition to our broad CGI and Q, to develop a system of six simultaneous equations. The four alternative CG structures are board size (BSIZE), leverage (LEV), block ownership (BLKOWN), and institutional ownership (INSOWN). We then estimate the six equations using 2SLS to investigate the link between the CG mechanisms and Q. The analysis involves two stages. In the first stage, we estimate each of equations (2) to (6) specified below (see Table 3 ), and save the resulting predicted values (i.e., predicted part of each CG structure). In the second stage, we use the predicted parts as instruments for the CG mechanisms, and equation (7) specified below is estimated along with the control variables and their respective instruments using 2SLS technique. The rationale is that the choice of any one mechanism may simultaneously depend on others to be able to impact positively on Q. The INSOWN, for example, may be positively related to the CGI. Thus, it may be the case that the valuation effect of the CGI may depend on the level of shareholder activism, and possibly on the other CG mechanisms. We describe how our system of six equations is developed below, and for brevity, all six equations in our system are presented in Table   3 . 
The Corporate Governance Index (the CGI)
It is assumed that the CGI 9 is determined by the choices of the other four alternative CG mechanisms (LEV, BLKOWN, INSOWN, and BSIZE) and the control variables, including growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), gearing (GEAR), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), industry dummy (INDUST), and year dummy (YD). The basis for the selection of the control variables has been presented previously. For example, and due to greater monitoring capacity associated with larger boards, larger audit firms, cross-listing, institutional shareholders, and the presence of a CG committee, we expect BIG4, BSIZE, CROSSLIST, CGCOM, LNTA, and INSOWN to impact positively on the CGI. We label all nine explanatory variables in combination as CONTROLS to form the first equation in the system to be estimated (see equation 2 of Table 3 ).
Leverage (LEV)
Greater debt usage can reduce the agency costs of "free cash flows" (Jensen, 1986) . Therefore, the second dependent variable in our system is leverage (LEV). Bevan and Danbolt (2004) report that LEV is positively correlated with firm size, but negatively associated with profitability. Hence, we expect LEV to correlate positively with firm size (LNTA), but be negatively related to Q. Also, as debt increases credit risks and bankruptcy costs (Jensen, 1986) , which may inhibit the capacity to exploit investment and growth opportunities, we expect growth (GROWTH) and investment (CAPEX) potential to be negatively associated with LEV. LEV is also expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD) . We refer to all five control variables together as CONTROLS to form the second equation in the system to be estimated (see equation 3 of Table 3 ).
Block Ownership (BLKOWN)
Greater managerial monitoring associated with block ownership can minimise agency costs and improve firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . In contrast, block owners can connive with managers to engage in tunnelling at the expense of minority owners . Hence, the third dependent variable in our system is block ownership (BLKOWN). It costs more to buy a proportion of shares in larger firms (Beiner et al., 2006) , and so BLKOWN is expected to relate negatively to firm size (LNTA). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that it is more attractive to hold shares in firms with greater growth and investment opportunities, and as such we predict that growth (GROWTH) and investment (CAPEX) potential will be positively related to BLKOWN. Also, gearing (GEAR) is expected to correlate negatively with BLKOWN as firms with BLKOWN are anticipated to use less debt (Bar et al., 1995; . BLKOWN is also expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD) . We label all six control variables in combination as CONTROLS to form the third equation to be estimated in the system (see equation 4 of Table 3 ).
Institutional Ownership (INSOWN)
Due to their relative financial clout, institutional shareholders can impact positively on CG structures and firm value (Barr et al., 1995) . Hence, the fourth dependent variable in our system is institutional ownership (INSOWN). It is more attractive to hold shares in larger firms with greater growth and investment potential (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) , and as such, we expect growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA) and the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) to correlate positively with INSOWN. Also, INSOWN is expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Hence, we refer to all six control variables in combination as CONTROLS to form the fourth equation to be estimated in the system (see equation 5 of Table 3 ).
Board Size (BSIZE)
Larger boards are associated with increased monitoring and greater opportunities to secure critical business resources that can enhance firm value . By contrast, Guest (2009) suggests that larger boards tend to be associated with greater free-riding and lower Q. Therefore, the fifth dependent variable in our system is board size (BSIZE). Smaller firms have greater growth prospects , and as such, we expect capital expenditure (CAPEX) and growth (GROWTH) to relate negatively to BSIZE. Further, it is expected that firm size (LNTA), crosslisting (CROSLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), gearing (GEAR) and the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) will relate positively to BSIZE. Board size is also expected to vary across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). We call all nine controls variables simply as CONTROLS to form the fifth equation to be estimated in the system (see equation 6 of Table 3 ).
Firm Value (Q)
Finally, to examine the link between Q and the five CG mechanisms, the dependent variable in the last equation in our system is Q. All the control variables (the basis for including the control variables has been already presented) included in equation (1) are labelled together as CONTROLS to form the final equation to be estimated in the system (see equation of 7 of Table 3 ). Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of all variables included in our regression analysis. It shows that Tobin"s Q ranges from a minimum of 0.72 to a maximum of 3.60
Empirical Results
Empirical Results: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Regression Analyses
10 with an average of 1.56, indicating wide variation in market valuation among the sampled firms. Our alternative firm value proxies (TSR and ROA), as well as the CGI and the Social-CGI also show wide spreads. For example, the CGI suggests that the scores range from a minimum of 6% (3 out of 50) to a maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average firm complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions analysed, an indication that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance SA firms attach to CG. Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. VIF is variance inflation factor regression value to test for the presence of multicollinearity.
Table 4 also indicates that, on average, compliance with the Social-CGI is higher than with the overall CGI.
For example, the median firm in our sample complied with 78% of the Social-CGI compared with 64% for the CGI, evidence (as discussed further below) that may be explained by political cost, legitimacy and resource independence theories. The alternative CG mechanisms (LEV, BSIZE, BLKOWN and INSOWN) , as well as the control variables, suggest wide spreads. This implies that the CG provisions and the sampled firms have been appropriately selected, and thus reduces the possibilities of sample selection bias that have arguably plagued much of the prior studies (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Renders et al., 2010) .
OLS regression is used to test all our hypotheses, and OLS assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity are tested. Table 5 contains the correlation matrix for all variables included in our analysis to test for multicollinearity, and as a robustness check, we report both the Pearson"s parametric and Spearman"s non-parametric coefficients. Both the magnitude and direction of the coefficients of the parametric and non-parametric correlations appear very similar, suggesting that no serious non-normality problems remain.
Apart from the expected high significant correlation between the CGI and its sub-index, the Social-CGI, both matrices suggest that correlations among the variables are relatively low, indicating that no major multicollinearity problems exist. However, some of the correlations are relatively high (for example the correlation between board size and CGI is 0.53). Therefore, and to be certain, we computed Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for our regressions in order to further test for the presence of multicollinearity. Noticeably, none of the VIF values for all our variables contained in Table 4 is above the critical value of 4, suggesting further that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our regression analyses. We further investigated (for brevity not reported here, but available upon request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, studentised residuals, Cook"s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics. The tests suggested no serious violation of the OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and autocorrelation, respectively.
Of interest, and in line with prior studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009) , the CGI is significant and positively related to Q, suggesting that better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation.
Additionally, there are significant relationships between the alternative CG mechanisms. For example, block ownership correlates negatively with the CGI, implying that it appears to serve as a substitute for better CG practices.
In contrast, board size and institutional ownership correlate positively with the CGI, indicating that the three CG mechanisms are complements. 
Notes:
The bottom left half of the table presents Pearson"s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table reports Spearman"s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, **, * and † denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: Tobin"s Q (Q), the corporate governance index (the CGI), the Social-CGI (S-CGI), board size (BSIZE), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), leverage (LEV), growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM). Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. Table 6 reports OLS regression results of Q on the CGI. Column 3 of Table 6 first presents the results of a simple regression of Q on the CGI only, whilst columns 4 to 9 contain the results of a regression of Q on the CGI and the control variables for the pooled 11 sample in addition to a regression for each of the 5 firm-years, respectively. As hypothesised, column 3 of Table 6 shows that the CGI is positive (0.003) and statistically significant (p<.001).
Empirical Results: OLS (Multivariate) Regression Analyses
However, the significant coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 6 seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, the control variables are added to the regressions and reported in columns 4 to 9 of Table 6 to control for potential omitted variables bias.
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on the CGI remains statistically significant and positive over the entire sample period. This implies that investors reward SA listed firms that have better CG standards with higher market valuation. An economic implication of our finding is that a positive one standard deviation change in the average firm"s CGI score from 61% to 80%, can be expected to be associated with an increase in its average market valuation (Q) by about 6% (19 x 0.003) from 1.56 to 1.65, ceteris paribus. Our results generally provide support to those of prior studies (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010) , but specifically to those of past cross-country studies whose samples include a small number of SA firms (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009 ).
The coefficients on the control variables in the lower part of columns 4 to 9 of Table 6 generally show the predicted signs. For example, and as hypothesised, audit firm size, crosslisting, growth and Q t-1 are positive and significantly associated with Q t , while the coefficient on firm size is negative and significantly related to Q over the entire sample period. In line with the results of Henry (2008) , the coefficients on the year dummies are significant, indicating that Q differs over time, but the insignificant coefficients on the industry dummies, except for consumer services firms, do not support the results of Beiner et al. (2006) . Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **, * and † denote p-value is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). The consumer goods industry and year 2003 are captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used.
As previously explained, the uniqueness of our CGI is that it incorporates nine SA context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions (see Section 4 of the Appendix). These issues are of great importance within the SA corporate context, due to the on-going policy debate as to whether given the voluntary nature of the CG regime, SA firms will voluntarily comply with these CG provisions (Maherbe and Segal, 2003) .
However, there are mixed theoretical positions regarding the impact that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions will have on firm value. Stakeholder theory (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007) suggests that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions imposes additional financial costs on SA firms. In contrast, political cost, legitimacy and resources dependence theories (Andreasson, 2013) indicate that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions does not only help in reducing political costs, such as the risk of nationalisation, but also offer greater access to resources, such as profitable government contracts. To investigate the impact of complying with affirmative action and stakeholder provisions on firm value, we run a separate regression of Q on the Social-CGI. We hypothesise a significant association between the Social-CGI and Q, but given the mixed literature, we do not specify the direction of the coefficient. Table 7 contains OLS regression results of Q on the Social-CGI. Column 3 of Table 7 first reports the results of a simple regression of Q on the Social-CGI alone, whereas columns 4 to 9 present the results of a regression of Q on the Social-CGI and the control variables for the full sample in addition to a regression for each of the five firmyears, respectively. Column 3 of Table 7 shows that the coefficient on the Social-CGI is positive (0.002) and significant (p<.001). The coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 7 is also, however, significant, which implies that there may be omitted variables bias. As a result, to test that whether the positive relationship between the Social-CGI and Q is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions in columns 4 to 9 of Table 7 . The coefficient on the Social-CGI remains significant and positive over the entire sample period, but the magnitude of the coefficient fluctuates between 0.001 and 0.008. This implies that, on average, firms that comply better with the Social-CGI tend to be associated with higher market valuation. The results also offer empirical support to political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. Within the SA context, apart from being part of King II and the JSE"s listing rules, some of the stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity and black empowerment are backed by statutory legislation. This implies that listed firms, and especially large companies, are more likely to voluntarily comply with the Social-CGI in order to minimise potential political costs and legitimise their operations.
Indeed, the significant positive correlation between the Social-CGI and firm size in Table 3 supports this hypothesis.
Crucially, and of particular relevance to basic materials and technology firms, securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally linked to meeting black empowerment and employment equity targets (Malherbe and Segal, 2003) . This means that compliance with the Social-CGI may be a major way by which firms can gain access to valuable resources that can facilitate growth and improve long-term market valuation.
This seems to serve as a major additional motivation for firms to voluntarily comply with the Social-CGI, and hence, appears to explain the positive link between the Social-CGI and Q.
Further, our results so far suggest that both the CGI and Social-CGI impact positively on Q with similar coefficients. The similarity of the magnitude of the coefficients implies they have similar economic impact. However, the CGI contains both shareholder and stakeholder related CG provisions, and therefore it is unclear, which component contributes more to firm value. From agency and resource dependence theoretical perspectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) , however, we will expect the shareholder related CG provisions to have a stronger valuation effect than the Social-CGI. Therefore, and to ascertain the relative role of shareholder and stakeholder (Social-CGI) components of the CGI, we construct a new index (known as Economic-CGI) containing 41 provisions from sections 1 (board, directors and ownership), 2 (accounting and auditing), 3 (risk management, internal audit and control), and 5 (encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement). Our expectation is that in a regression containing both (Economic-CGI and Social-CGI), the strongest contributor to firm value will dominate the other. Therefore, we re-estimate equation 1 by replacing the CGI with both the Economic-CGI and
Social-CGI.
The results (which for brevity not reported, but available on request) suggest that the coefficient on the Economic-CGI is positive (0.008) and statistically significant (p<.001), whilst that on the Social-CGI is positive (0.001), but statistically insignificant (p>.10). This offers new evidence which suggests that shareholder related CG provisions have a stronger positive effect on market valuation than their stakeholder counterparts. Theoretically, our evidence suggests that firms with good shareholder related CG practices receive higher investor valuation, and therefore the value creation is in the main through shareholder rather than stakeholder related CG practices.
Robustness Analyses
Our regression analysis so far does not take into account the existence of alternative CG mechanisms, firm value proxies, CG weighting scheme, other estimation techniques and endogeneity. The positive association between the CGI and firm value, for example, could consequently be misleading. In this section, we examine how sensitive our results are to the presence of alternative CG mechanisms and endogenous relationships (especially simultaneous endogeneity), firm value proxies, CG weighting scheme, and firm-level fixed effects. (2) to (7) Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we use OLS to estimate equation (7), which permits the existence of all the alternative CG mechanisms, but does not allow for interdependencies. The rationale is to ascertain what happens to the CGI in the presence of alternative CG structures. Of special note, the results (for brevity not reported here, but available upon request) indicate that the CGI remains positive and significant (p<.001) in the presence of other CG structures. Also, the coefficients on board size and institutional ownership are both significant (p<.05) and positively associated with Q, whereas leverage and block ownership are insignificantly related to Q. Noticeably, the positive association between board size and Q supports the results of Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008) , but rejects those of Guest (2009) . Second, and following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , we estimate equation (7) along with equations (2) to (6) as a system of simultaneous equations, using 2SLS 12 . Specifically, in the first stage, we estimate each of equations (2) to (6) specified above along with their respective control variables, and the resulting predicted values (i.e., predicted part of each CG structure) are saved. In the second stage, we use the predicted parts as instruments 13 for the CG mechanisms, and equation (7) is estimated along with the control variables and their respective instruments using the 2SLS technique. As previously explained, this procedure considers firm value (Q) as endogenous along with the five CG structures, which allows each of the CG mechanisms to affect all the others in order to detect complementary or substitution effects, but also permits Q to affect the choice of each CG structure. Table 8 contains the results of a 2SLS estimation of equations (2) to (7). Most importantly, the coefficient on the CGI in column 8 of Table 8 remains positive and significant (p<.01), implying that our finding of a positive relationship between the CGI and Q is robust to endogeneity and/or the introduction of alternative CG mechanisms into the analysis. It also provides further empirical support to the results of prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Morey et al., 2009 ) that better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation. Our 2SLS results reported in column 8 of Table 8 further indicate that the coefficients on board size and institutional ownership remain significant and positive, whereas those of leverage and block ownership are still insignificant. The positive association between Q and board size again supports the results of Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008) , but contradicts those of Guest (2009).
Results from a 2SLS Estimation of Equations
Additionally, the results in Table 8 reveal significant interdependencies among the five CG structures and Q.
First, our results presented in column 3 show that the coefficient on Q is positive and significant (p<.001), implying that higher CGI scores is not only associated with higher firm valuation, but that there is a reverse association (i.e., SA firms with higher Q values also appear to adopt better CG practices). Consistent with our hypothesis, the findings contained in column 3 suggest that larger board size, higher institutional ownership and greater leverage usage are significantly associated with higher CGI scores, but higher block ownership is significantly related to lower CGI values. This suggests substitutability between the CGI and block ownership, an indication that firms with poor CG structures can compensate for that with a dominant block shareholder. It also supports the view that firms optimally choose CG structures, whereby a greater use of one CG mechanism may lead to a lesser use of others, resulting in equally good performance.
Second, our results reported in column 4 of Table 8 indicate that block ownership is positively and significantly related to leverage, rejecting our hypothesis that SA firms with significant block ownership are likely to use less debt. The insignificant link between Q and leverage also does not support capital structure and Jensen"s (1986) "free cash flow" theories that greater leverage is associated with higher market valuation. Third, our results contained in column 5 of Table 8 indicate that there is a significant reverse association between block ownership and the CGI, supporting our hypothesis that the two are substitutes. Institutional ownership, leverage and board size have a significant and positive relationship with block ownership, but firms with higher block ownership do not necessarily receive lower market valuation. Fourth, consistent with our predictions, the results reported in column 6 reveal that there is a significant complementary relationship between institutional ownership and the CGI, and also between institutional and block ownerships. The results imply that due to greater financial strength, firms with greater institutional ownership tend to have better CG standards. Finally, the results presented in column 7 of Table 8 show that firms with higher CGI scores and institutional ownership tend to be significantly associated with larger boards, revealing that the three CG mechanisms are complements. 
Alternative Firm Value Proxies, CG Weights and Firm-Level Fixed Effects
In this final subsection, we conduct three further sets of sensitivity analyses, specifically relating to alternative firm value proxies, CG weights and estimation techniques. First, we investigate how sensitive our results are to two alternative firm value proxies: total share returns (TSR -a market based measure) and return on assets (ROA -an accounting based proxy). As previously noted, these firm value measures have been used widely within the CG literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010) . As with Q, better-governed firms are expected to be associated with higher ROA and TSR. Table 9 reports regression results based on the alternative firm value proxies, CG weights and estimation technique. Columns 3 and 4 contain OLS regression results of TSR on the CGI without and with the control variables, respectively, while columns 5 and 6 report similarly for the ROA. Our results show that the coefficients on the CGI in columns 3 to 6 remain positive and significant, at least at the 5% level. This indicates that our results are robust when a market (TSR) or an accounting (ROA) based measure of firm value is used instead of Tobin"s Q.
Second, and similar to Beiner et al. (2006) , we examine whether our results depend on the weighting of the five sections of our CGI. As previously noted, all 50 provisions forming the CGI are equally weighted, but the number of provisions varies across the five sections. Thus, this simple equal weighting scheme results in different weights being assigned to each of the five sections: board, directors, and ownership (54%), accounting and auditing (12%), risk management, internal audit and control (10%), integrated sustainability reporting (18%), and compliance and enforcement (6%). To ascertain whether our results are sensitive to the weighting of the five sections, we construct an alternative CGI, defined as Weighted-CGI, in which each of the five sections is awarded equal weight of 20%. Our results reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 9 indicate that the coefficients of the Weighted-CGI in the analysis of the cross-sectional variation in Q are positive and significant (p<.10), suggesting that our results are robust to this alternative weighting scheme. .33(.00) Finally, as firms tend to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they encounter over time, this can result in a situation where CG and firm value are jointly and dynamically determined by unobserved firm-specific variables (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009) , which simple OLS regressions may be unable to detect. Thus, given the panel nature of our data and in line with Henry (2008) and Guest (2009) , we estimate a fixed effects model to account for possible unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. This involves re-estimating equation (1), with the inclusion of 168 dummies to represent the 169 sampled firms. Our fixed effects results contained in column 9 of Table 9 show that the coefficient on the CGI remains positive and significant (p<.10), an indication that our results are robust to potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. Overall, the results from our robustness tests make us reasonably confident that our main evidence of a positive link between CG and firm value in SA is not falsely driven by any form of endogeneity.
Summary and Conclusions
The paper investigates the relationship between a broad corporate governance (CG) index and firm value using a First, our main conclusion is that we find a significant and positive association between good CG practices (CGI) and Tobin"s Q (Q), implying that better-governed SA firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation.
Distinct from most prior studies, our evidence is robust to different forms of endogeneity, as well as different types of accounting and market-based firm value proxies. Second, the distinctive features of the South African CG framework allows us to uniquely analyse the relationship between complying with affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions (Social-CGI) and the market value of SA listed firms. Our results show that SA firms that comply better with the stakeholder CG provisions tend to be associated with higher market valuation. The results provide empirical support to political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. Within the SA corporate context, compliance with stakeholder CG provisions appears to be a major way by which listed firms can reduce political costs, such as the risk of nationalisation, and also gain access to resources, such as profitable government contracts to facilitate growth and improve long-term firm value. Further, analysis of the relative role of shareholder and stakeholder related CG practices suggest that CG provisions relating to shareholders are valued more highly than their stakeholder related counterparts, implying that the shareholder value creation is primarily through shareholder CG practices rather than stakeholder ones.
Third, different from most past studies, our results do not change when controlling for possible interdependencies among alternative CG mechanisms (board size, leverage, block ownership, and institutional ownership) and Q using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The rationale is to ascertain whether our broad CG index (CGI) is simultaneously and dynamically determined by firm value (Q), as well as the other four CG mechanisms. Most importantly, the 2SLS results show that our SACGI remains positively and significantly related to Q in the presence of the other four CG mechanisms. However, the 2SLS results also suggest that there is a reverse association between our broad CG index and Q (i.e., higher CGI scores may not only be associated with higher Q, but also SA firms with higher Q appear to adopt better CG practices). We also find evidence of significant interdependencies among the five CG mechanisms, including a negative relationship between block ownership and the CGI, implying that SA firms with poor CG structures can compensate for that with a dominant block shareholder without necessarily receiving lower market valuation. This re-enforces the need for future research to fully take into account possible alternative CG mechanisms in order to produce robust evidence. Fourth, our results have important policy and regulatory implications. The prior literature suggests that a good CG framework is crucial to corporate success, and our results suggest that the market rewards firms with better CG practices with higher market valuation. As an emerging market, good CG practices are particularly important as this may not only help reduce corporate failures, but also assist companies to attract foreign direct investments, which may facilitate faster economic growth and development in SA. For managers and corporations, the significant positive link between the Social-CGI and firm value implies that SA listed firms/managers may need to pay serious attention to voluntarily complying with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions and also in preparing the integrated sustainability report. In this respect, efforts by the SA Institute of Directors (IoD), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the King Committee, and the JSE at enhancing CG practices in SA corporations are laudable.
However, the substantial variation in the levels of compliance with important provisions, especially by firms with high block ownership, suggests that enforcement may need to be strengthened further. In this regard, setting up a "compliance and enforcement committee" to continuously monitor compliance levels among listed companies may be a step in the right direction.
Further, and from a broader policy perspective, our results suggest that the presence of larger boards with strong monitoring capacity, active institutional shareholders, and greater debt usage can enhance CG standards in SA, which can create value not only for shareholders, but also stakeholders. One policy implication of this evidence is that for the current hybrid South African CG framework to be effective, the SA government (DTI) and regulatory bodies (e.g., JSE and IoD) should direct more efforts at enhancing shareholder activism through greater institutional shareholding and encouraging increased board transparency and independence. By contrast and as greater block ownership leads to poor CG practices with negative implications for both shareholders and stakeholders, the SA regulatory authorities, especially the JSE should further strengthen efforts at creating diffuse or disperse ownership structures in SA corporations. This can be done by further increasing the minimum external shareholdings listing threshold (especially by local and foreign institutional shareholdings) by revising the JSE"s current (2007) Finally, whilst our findings are important and robust, some caveats are in order. We use a binary coding scheme which treats every CG mechanism as equally important. Whilst results based on our equally weighted CGI and the alternatively weighted index are essentially similar, future studies may enrich their analysis by constructing weighted and un-weighted CG indices. Also, due to data limitations, we use only four alternative CG structures in our 2SLS analysis. As more data becomes available, future studies may need to introduce more mechanisms, such as data on the market for corporate control, in their analysis.
Notes
4. It takes time for the effects of governance mechanisms to reflect in firm value (Render et al., 2010) . Hence, to avoid endogenous association between firm value and CG, we introduce a one year lag between CG and firm value such that a firm"s value in any year (Qt) depends on the previous year"s governance structure (CGt-1), similar to Renders et al. (2010 which data is available is introduced in Section five. These proxies measure the efficiency and effectiveness with which a firm uses its assets to generate accounting profits (ROA), as well as maximise market value (TSR). As with Q, firms with effective CG structures are expected to be related to higher ROA and TSR. Previous studies indicate that insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors) value CG differently (Black et al., 2006) . As such, the accounting (ROA) and market (TSR) alternative firm value proxies attempt to measure the wealth effects of CG structures from the perspectives of insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors), respectively. As with Q, they have been used widely, and so their empirical validity is grounded in a rigorously established empirical literature (Klapper and Love, 2004; Guest, 2009 ). 7. For lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, namely health care, oil & gas, and telecommunications industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, observations from these industries were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. As a result (see Panel B of Table 1 ), the three health care firms were added to the consumer services industry, the one oil & gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, while the three telecommunications companies were included in the technology firms. 8. This is still largely true for SA and all countries that follow UK"s principle of encouraging listed firms to qualitatively comply with CG codes by "complying" or "explaining" themselves in case of non-compliance with the provisions. This is because while compliance with CG codes in such countries is voluntary, they are usually appended to Stock Exchange listings rules for which consistent non-compliant listed firms may face serious sanctions, such as suspension or de-listing (e.g., Malherbe and Segal. 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008 ). 9. We acknowledge that it is possible for interdependencies to exist among the various components of the CGI. In fact, and theoretically, the construction of the CGI is based on the central assumption that there is the potential for its various components to interrelate, and thereby reducing the potential for spurious correlations that may arise from the presence of different types of endogeneity problems, such as omitted variables, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions (see e.g., Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) that are often associated with individual/single CG mechanisms (Agrawal And Knoeber, 1996; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Gomper et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006) . 10. To minimise the effects of outliers, and following Renders et al. (2010) , we winsorise all the variables at the conventional 1% and 99% levels. However, the whole regression analysis was first run with the outliers included, and the results were essentially the same. The main rationale for winsorising is to minimise potential serious violations of the OLS assumptions. 11. To ensure that the residuals of a given firm may not be correlated across different years (time-series dependence) or firms (crosssectional dependence) within our five-year panel (Gujarati, 2003) , and following Petersen (2009) Beiner et al., 2006, p.267 for a detailed description of the procedure) to test for the endogeneity of the CG mechanisms and Q. Applied to equation 7, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level. Thus, we conclude that 2SLS technique is appropriate and that our OLS results may be misleading (i.e., biased and inconsistent). 13. The order-condition for identifying a system suggests that the number of exogenous variables excluded from any equation must be greater than or equal to the number of endogenous variables included minus one (Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006) . Our system of equations consists of nine exogenous and six endogenous variables. Hence, at least three of our exogenous variables must be excluded from any single equation to identify the system. However, following prior research (Beiner et al., 2006; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) , equations (2) to (7) are separately developed based on theory, logic and data availability without excessive regard to meeting the ordercondition. As over-identification cannot jeopardise our system (Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006) , all our six equations are overidentified. Also, we carried out a Sargan test for instrument exogeneity, but could not be rejected (at least at the 10% level) for all six equations. We are, therefore, reasonably certain that our instruments are exogenous and our system is not misspecified.
39. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing the broad-based black economic empowerment and empowerment of women laws, including black equity ownership, preferential procurement, enterprise development, and executive management control is disclosed. 40. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing employment equity laws in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and disabilities is disclosed. 41. Whether a narrative on how a firm is addressing the threat posed by HIV/Aids pandemic in South Africa is disclosed. 42. Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address occupational health and safety of its employees is disclosed. 43. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing rules and regulations on the environment is disclosed. 44. Whether a narrative on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed. 45. Whether a firm"s board is formed by at least 1 white and 1 non-white (board diversity on the basis of ethnicity) person. 46. Whether a firm"s board is formed by at least 1 male and 1 female (board diversity on the basis of gender)
person. 47. Whether a narrative on the actual community support and other corporate social investments or responsibilities is disclosed.
Section 5: Encouraging Voluntary Compliance and Enforcement
48. Whether a positive statement on the compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance provisions of King II is disclosed. 49. Whether a narrative on how a firm is contributing towards the development of financial journalism is disclosed. 50. Whether a narrative on what a firm is doing to encourage shareholder activism, like having investor relations department and proxy voting is disclosed.
